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Introduction 
That the requirement of a prior authorisation, as a precondition for the exercise of 
any economic activity, may restrict the freedom of establishment and the free 
provision of services is a truism. If an authorisation is required in the Member State 
where establishment is to take place or the service is to be offered (host Member 
State), then operators who lack such authorisation are in no right to proceed to the 
projected activity. Therefore, as soon as it is being accepted that the EU internal 
market rules are not only about discriminatory measures, but also cover mere 
restrictions, it comes as no surprise that national authorisation systems come to be 
scrutinized under the Internal Market rules.  
This has been acknowledged by the Court in an explicit manner already in its 1986 
Insurance cases
1 and constantly thereafter. The idea that authorisations restrict the 
provision of services has been enshrined into secondary legislation in many sector-
specific texts starting with the “passport” systems in the field of insurance, banking 
and financial services.
2  The ‘internal market clause’ introduced by the Television 
without Frontiers (TVWF) Directive and the e- Directives also tries to side-step the 
need for obtaining a fresh authorisation in the host state. The sector-specific 
directives for the network-bound industries also describe several conditions for the 
authorisation of operators in order to curb Member State discretion.
3  More 
importantly and in a horizontal way, authorisations are solemnly held to be against 
the free provision of services by Articles 9-13 of the Services Directive. The fact, 
therefore, that national authorisation systems may fall foul of the Internal Market rules 
is granted.  
                                                            
∗∗ Draft; a final version is to appear in P. Adriaanse, F. van Ommeren, W. den Ouden (eds) Allocation of 
limited authorisations and grants in the EU member states  Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, (2013, 
forthcoming); comments welcome at vasshtz@socadm.duth.gr.  
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Member of the Athens Bar; the author may be contacted at vasshatz@socadm.duth.gr.  
1 See most prominently Case 205/84 Commission v. Germany (insurance) [1986] ECR 3755 paras 42 et 
seq. 
2 For which see broadly Lomincka, E., ‘The Home Country Control Principle in the Financial Services 
Directives and the Case Law’ in Andenas, M. and Roth, W.H. (eds), Services and Free Movement in EU 
Law  (Oxford: OUP, 2002) 295-319.; and before that Hatzopoulos, V., Le principe communautaire 
d’équivalence et de reconnaissance mutuelle dans la libre prestation de services (Athènes/Bruxelles: 
Sakkoulas/Bruylant, 1999) 414-49. 
3 See in particular Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 
on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) [2002] 
OJ L 108/21. Indeed, the applicability of the Internal Market rules may offer not only a different 
specter of analysis than the application of the competition rules, especially since 
public measures are at stake. What is more it may allow the CJEU to tackle technical 
issues even though it is lacking the technical information that an appreciation under 
the competition rules would require.
4  
This, however, does not lead to all national authorisation systems being struck down. 
On the contrary, the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) offers 
extremely interesting indications as to the situations where an authorisation system 
could be accepted (I), the conditions that such a system should fulfill in order to 
comply with the Internal Market requirements (II) and the extent to which the host 
Member State is obliged to take into account authorisations delivered in other 
Member States (III). 
I. When may an authorisation system be justified? 
The answer to the above question calls for the exploration of two further questions, ie 
what are the grounds on which a Member State may introduce an authorisation 
system (a) and to what extent does the Member State in question has to prove that 
such a system is necessary and proportional (b).  
a. Grounds for justification of an authorisation system 
i. The provision of some service of general economic interest (SGEI) 
Services of general economic interest have historically been offered by the State, 
especially within the continental tradition.
5  The trend in the last twenty years, 
however, has been to entrust private entities with the accomplishment of several 
such services. In doing so, States have been awarding exclusive or special rights to 
several undertakings. Such grant of exclusive or special rights is generally accepted 
under EU law. While at first Member States seemed to enjoy seamless discretion as 
                                                            
4  See eg Case C-380/05  Centro Europa 7 Srl  [2008] ECR I-349  for an example where the Court 
declared inadmissible a preliminary question for the application of Art 106(2) TFEU in conjunction with 
Art 102 TFEU, for lack of sufficient information contained in the preliminary ruling, but did go on and 
discussed the issues under the Internal Market rules; the same approach was followed in Case C-
384/08 Attanasio Group Srl [2010] ECR I-2055. 
5 For an excellent comparison of the continental to the anglosaxon tradition in relation to the provision of 
services of general interest see Harlow, C., ‘Public service, market ideology and  citizenship’ in 
Freedland, M. and Sciarra, S. (eds), Public services and citizenship in European law: Public and labour 
law perspectives  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 48-56. Please note that the conversation which 
follows only concerns services of general economic interest, as opposed to non-economic services of 
general interest, over which EU law has, in principle, no impact.  to when/where they would award exclusive rights,
6 more recent case law suggests 
that the grant of exclusive rights should be objectively justified and should not lead to 
an abuse of dominant position by the beneficiary undertaking.
7  The Court’s 
ambivalent approach has been recently resumed as follows:
8  
78      […] the Treaty does not require national monopolies having a commercial 
character to be abolished completely, but requires them to be adjusted in such 
a way as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which 
goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member States 
[…]. 
79      However, Article 49 EC [56 TFEU] precludes the application of any national 
rules which have the effect of making the provision of services between 
Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one 
Member State […]. 
If exclusive and special rights are accepted, then the less restrictive authorisation 
systems – which only exceptionally entail exclusivity – should raise no worries under 
EU law. Therefore, in BUPA, the General Court accepted that a system of 
authorisation of several operators in the field of healthcare going ‘beyond ordinary 
conditions of authorisation […] satisfies the condition of a clear and precise definition 
of the SGEI obligations in question within the meaning of the first Altmark condition’.
9 
Thus, not only did the General Court accept that the system of prior authorisation 
established by the Irish legislation did not infringe the Internal Market rules, it also 
held that it qualified under the  Altmark  first condition, thus also allowing for the 
circumvention of the State aid rules.
10 
In a similar manner in ASM Brescia the Court in the name of legal security, approved 
of the extension, by way of a transitional period, of the exclusive public service 
licenses for the distribution of natural gas in southern Italy.
11 Although the licenses 
already in place had been granted without following the EU public procurement 
principles (of transparency etc)
12 and thus constituted ‘indirect discrimination on the 
                                                            
6 Case 155/73 Giuseppe Sacchi [1974] ECR 409. 
7 Case C-260/89 ERT v. DEP and Sotirios Kouvelas [1991] ECR I-2925; Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner 
and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979. 
8 Centro Europa 7 above n 4, paras 78-9. 
9 Case T-289/03 BUPA [2008] ECR II-81 paras 182-3. 
10 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans [2003] ECR I-7747. 
11 Case C-347/06 ASM Brescia SpA v Comune di Rodengo Saiano [2008] ECR I-5641. 
12 For which see below n 18 and the corresponding text. basis of nationality, prohibited under Articles 43 EC and 49 EC’
13, the Court accepted 
that ‘the principle of legal certainty not only permits but also requires that the 
termination of such a concession be coupled with a transitional period which enables 
the contracting parties to untie their contractual relations on acceptable terms both 
from the point of view of the requirements of the public service  and from the 
economic point of view’.
14  
ii. The allocation of rare resources 
The Court’s lenient approach in ASM Brescia is to be contrasted with its judgment in 
Centro Europa 7, where it Court condemned Italy for not taking the necessary 
legislative measures to ensure that operators who had previously obtained 
authorisations for radio broadcasting (according to the relevant EU directive
15) do 
obtain the corresponding radio frequencies. Contrary to the situation in Brescia the 
Court held that ‘the Italian legislation […] does not merely allocate to the incumbent 
operators a priority right to obtain radio frequencies, but reserves them that right 
exclusively, without restricting in time the privileged position assigned to those 
operators and without providing for any obligation to relinquish the radio 
frequencies’.
16  
The above case lies half-way between the organization of public service (of radio 
broadcasting) and the allocation of scarce resources (of radio frequencies). In this 
latter case, the institution of a system of authorisations is inevitable.  
In relation to radio frequencies the grant of authorisation is organized by the relevant 
directive. For other scarce resources, for which there is no sector-specific legislation, 
Article 12(1) of the Services Directive provides that ‘Member States shall apply a 
selection procedure to potential candidates which provides full guarantees of 
impartiality and transparency, including, in particular, adequate publicity about the 
launch, conduct and completion of the procedure.’  
The principle remains, however, that scarce resources not only tolerate, but also call 
for a system of authorisations.  
                                                            
13 ASM Brescia para 60. 
14 Ibid para 71, emphasis added. 
15  Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) [2002] OJ L 
108/21. 
16 Centro Europa 7 above n 4, para 115. iii. The protection of public policy, public security and public health 
The above rule of the Services Directive draws its inspiration in the Court’s judgment 
in Placanica, while at the same time complementing it. In this judgment the Court 
held that where a Member State decides to limit the number of 
authorisations/licenses granted for a given activity, in casu  gambling, it should 
proceed to the ‘revocation and redistribution of the old licences or the award by 
public tender of an adequate number of new licences’.
17 The reference to a ‘public 
tender’ is a clear indication that the award of new licences should take place in 
accordance with the ‘public procurement principles’ based on transparency, which 
have been developed in the meantime by the Court of Justice. 
18  
The ruling in Placanica  is different from the rule of Article 12(1) of the Services 
Directive in that it acknowledges that an authorisation system may be justified not 
only in cases of natural/technical scarcity, but also where the ‘artificial’ restriction of a 
given economic activity is justified by reasons of public policy, public security or 
public health. Indeed, all the subsequent gambling and gaming cases iteratively 
confirm the discretion left to Member States to adopt systems of legal monopolies,
19 
or of strict (and even discriminatory) authorisation conditions, in order to combat 
fraud, protect consumers, restrain the propensity for gambling and the like. Such a 
system of authorisations, however, in order to be proportional should fulfil a further 
condition: it ‘must be accompanied by a legislative framework suitable for ensuring 
that the holder of the said monopoly [or authorisations] will in fact be able to pursue, 
in a consistent and systematic manner, the objective thus determined by means of a 
                                                            
17 Joined cases C-338 & 359 & 360/04 Criminal Proceedings against Massimiliano Placanica ea [2007] 
ECR I-1891, para 63. 
18 By ‘procurement principles’ reference is made to the extremely reach body of case law, starting with 
Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG [2000] ECR 
I-10745; Case C-234/03 Contse SA, Vivisol Srl and Oxigen Salud SA v. Instituto Nacional de Gestion 
Sanitaria (Ingesa), formerly Instituto Nacional de la Salud (Insalud) [2005] ECR I-9315; and Case C-
458/03  Parking Brixen GmBH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585, 
whereby the Court acknowledges that the principle of non-discrimination and of equal treatment, and the 
principle of transparency that these entail, should apply to all procedures of award of some 
contract/authorisation by the public authorities, even if these do not fall within the scope of the public 
procurement directives; this is also known as ‘the transparency case law’; for a brief discussion of the 
above developments see Bovis, C, ‘Developing Public Procurement Regulation : Jurisprudence an its 
Influence on Law Making’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 461-95 and more recently Bovis, C ‘Public Procurement 
in the EU: Jurisprudence and Conceptual Directions’ (2006) 49 CMLRev 247-90. 
19 Case C-67/98 Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti [1999] ECR I-7289, para 35, and Case C-6/01 
Associação Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) eo [2003] ECR I-8621, para 
74, Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International Ltd v Departamento 
de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa [2009] ECR I-7633; Joined cases C-316/07 & C-
409-410/07 & C-358-360/07 Markus Stoß ea [2010] ECR I-8069; Case C-347/09 Jochen Dickinger and  
Franz Ömer [2011] nyr.  supply that is quantitatively measured and qualitatively planned by reference to the 
said objective and subject to strict control by the public authorities.’
20   
Therefore, where the imposition of a system of authorisations/licences is not dictated 
by objective (natural/technical) necessity but corresponds to the legitimate exercise 
of discretionary power by the Member States, such system should a) be part of a 
broader series of measures that pursue the same objective
21 and b) be subject to 
control by the public authorities as to the actual achievement of the fixed objective. 
By this latter requirement authorisations justified by public policy rejoin those 
connected to the provision of some SGEI, who need also be subject to a system of 
supervision/evaluation – and possibly review. 
iv. The pursuance of other overriding reasons of public interest (ORPIs) 
If public policy and other express justifications foreseen in the Treaty allow Member 
States to put into place authorisation systems, the same is not clear in relation to 
ORPIs. The fact that up till now the Court has accepted ORPIs as the basis for 
justifying authorisation schemes could be undermined by recent case law.  
Indeed, the Court has not only accepted ORPIs as the basis of imposition of an 
authorisation system,
22 but it has occasionally used ORPIs indistinctively together 
with the protection of public policy, an express exception foreseen by the Treaty. 
Hence in Stoss,  
the Court has observed that the objectives pursued by national legislation 
adopted in the area of gambling and bets, considered as a whole, usually 
concern the protection of the recipients of the services in question and of 
consumers more generally [two ORPIs], and the protection of public order [an 
express exception under Article 52 TFEU]. It has also held that such 
                                                            
20 Markus Stoss para 83.  
21 For an analysis of the requirements that measures be ‘coherent and systematic’ see Mathisen, G., 
‘Consistency and Coherence as Conditions for Justification of Member State Measures Restricting Free 
Movement’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 1021–48; my view is somehow different, since I understand this test as 
follows. Coherence is an internal test and looks into the very content of the measure under scrutiny, 
essentially asking the question ‘does it make sense?’ or ‘is it logical?’. It looks into the restrictive 
measure and enquires whether the restriction is a standalone rule or, whether, on the contrary, it forms 
part of a coherent system. Consistency, on the other hand, is an external test and refers to the way the 
contemplated measure relates to other policies affecting the same legitimate objective; see Hatzopoulos 
Regulating Services op.cit. 176-8. 
22  See eg recently Case C-400/2008  Commission v Spain (Shopping Centers) [2011] nyr, para 80, 
where the Court accepted that ‘restrictions relating to the location and size of large retail establishments 
appear to be methods suitable for achieving the objectives relating to town and country planning and 
environmental protection’. objectives are amongst the overriding reasons in the public interest capable 
of justifying obstacles to the freedom to provide services’.
23 
What is more, Article 9(1) of the Services Directive specifically provides that 
authorisation requirements may be justified by ORPIs.  
This solution, systematically followed by the Court and expressly enshrined into the 
Services Directive, should be considered as the current state of the law.  
This, however, should not veil the hints in the Court’s case law which could 
eventually lead to dismissing ORPIs as a ground for upholding authorisation 
systems. Indeed, according to the Court’s well-established – and yet non-systematic 
– case law, ORPIs may only serve as justifications to non-discriminatory restrictions, 
while discriminatory ones may only be saved by some of the express Treaty 
provisions (essentially public policy, public security and public health). It is true that 
several judgments deviate from this general rule,
24 but overall the Court seems still to 
be attached to it.
25 
If this is so, then the judgments in which the Court implies that authorisation 
procedures are not merely restrictive, but plainly discriminatory should raise the 
question of whether they could validly be upheld by virtue of some ORPI. Such 
judgments are all but rare. If in the early German Insurance case the element of 
discrimination was looming, since Placanica, and even more since the recent Costa 
and Cifone judgments,
26  the Court has made it clear that under certain 
circumstances the requirement of an authorisation/licence will be discriminating in 
favour of the national undertakings already present in the market and against free 
movers from other Member States. It is in order to redress this discrimination that the 
Court suggested, in Placanica, that the Italian Government should either proceed to 
the ‘revocation and redistribution of the old licences or [to] the award by public tender 
of an adequate number of new licences’.
27 Discrimination will be more pronounced 
whenever the delivery of a new authorisation/license is conditional upon some 
territoriality clause. In Attanasio Group, concerning the delivery of new authorisations 
for petrol stations in Italy subject to a territoriality clause, the Court  held that
28  
                                                            
23 Stoss para 74; this confusion is not uncommon in the case law; for a discussion see Hatzopoulos, V. 
‘La justification des atteintes aux libertés de circulation : cadre méthodologique et spécificités 
matérielles’ in Dubout, A. & Lemaire, A. (eds) L’unicité des libertés fondamentales du traité, (Bruxelles : 
Bruylant/Larcier, under press); see also Hatzopoulos, V., Regulating Services in the EU (Oxford: OUP, 
2012) 146-79. 
24 See in the previous n. 
25  See eg Case C-341/05  Laval un Partneri Ltd [2007] ECR I-11767, para 117;  Case C-219/08 
Commission v. Belgium (posted workers) [2009] ECR I-9213;  Case C-153/08  Commission v Spain 
(gambling tax) [2009] ECR I-9735. 
26 Joined Cases C-72/10 and C-77/10 Marcello Costa, Ugo Cifone [2012] nyr. 
27 Placanica above n 17, para 63. 
28 Attanasio Group above n 4, para 45. [s]uch a rule, which applies only to new service stations and not to service 
stations already in existence before the entry into force of the rule, makes 
access to the activity of fuel distribution subject to conditions and, by being 
more advantageous to operators who are already present on the Italian 
market, is liable to deter, or even prevent, access to the Italian market by 
operators from other Member States. 
Similarly in the Spanish Shopping Centres case, the Court, while hinting to some kind 
of discrimination, held the authorisation procedures, in general, and the territoriality 
clause, in particular, to restrict market access for free movers from other Member 
States.
29 
In Costa and Cifone, however, a follow-up case to the Placanica litigation, the Court 
opted for a more radical condemnation of the territoriality clause attached to the new 
licenses. It held that 
The very fact that the existing operators have been able to start up several 
years earlier than the operators unlawfully excluded, and have accordingly 
been able to establish themselves on the market with a certain reputation and 
a measure of customer loyalty, confers on them an unfair competitive 
advantage. To grant the existing operators even greater competitive 
advantages  over the new licence holders has the consequence of 
entrenching and exacerbating the effects of the unlawful exclusion of the 
latter from the 1999 tendering procedure, and accordingly constitutes a new 
breach of Articles 43 EC and 49 EC and of the principle of equal treatment.
30 
[…] 
In consequence, such a measure entails discrimination against the operators 
which were excluded from the 1999 tendering procedure.
31 
In this more recent case, therefore, the Court’s analysis clearly moved from the logic 
of restrictions to market access, and identified a measure which is discriminatory (at 
least) in fact. The fact that in this very case the Court did accept ORPIs such as ‘the 
reduction of betting and gaming opportunities, and the combating of criminality by 
making the operators active in the sector subject to control’
32 as justifications, may 
not grant that ORPIs will be admitted in the future without more ado.   
                                                            
29 Case C-400/08 Commission v Spain (shopping centres) [2011] nyr, para 64.  
30 Costa and Cifone para 53, emphasis added. 
31 Ibid para 58, emphasis added. 
32 Ibid para 61.  b.  Burden of proof 
Since any authorisation system constitutes a restriction to – if not a discrimination 
against  – free movers, its imposition by a Member State need be justified. Such 
justification does not take place in abstracto, but needs be substantiated by the 
Member State concerned, against the allegations of the plaintiff undertaking (in 
preliminary rulings) or the Commission (in direct actions). Hence, the allocation of the 
burden of proof has a direct incidence on the kinds of authorisation systems which 
will be allowed by the Court. In this respect the Court’s case law is clear in some 
respects and less clear in others.   
i. Clear rules 
Prima facie restriction: for the Commission or the plaintiff 
In direct actions, it is clear that the Commission has to make a prima facie case by 
demonstrating that the contested authorisation scheme has as its object or effect to 
block market access or else to hinder free movement.
33 Over fifty-five years after the 
creation of the EEC, very few national measures will have as their proclaimed object 
the restriction of free movement; what becomes crucial, therefore, are the effects of 
any given measure. The Court will go as far as to ignore the expressed protectionist 
intent of any measure and will focus on its effects.
34  
Similarly, in preliminary rulings, it is for the plaintiff to propose and for the referring 
court to substantiate the way in which the contested measure may affect free 
movement. Failing which the Court will reject the preliminary question as being 
inadmissible, either on the ground that it is purely hypothetical or that it is purely 
internal and bears no relationship with any of the Treaty freedoms.
35 In view of the 
well-established case law and the texts of secondary legislation discussed above,
36 
however, it is highly unlikely that the Court will ever reject any preliminary question 
concerning some authorisation scheme. 
The existence of justification: the Member State 
Once this prima facie restriction has been established, then it is for the Member State 
to prove that its system of authorisations is justified by some objective interest. In this 
regard Member States enjoy unrestricted freedom to pick the policy objectives they 
consider fit, subject to minimal control by the CJEU. Indeed, in the fifty-five year of 
                                                            
33 See eg Case C-565/08 Commission v Italy (Lawyer’s fees) [2011] nyr, para 52. 
34 Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779. 
35  See Davies Davies, G., ‘Abstractness and concreteness in the preliminary ruling procedure: 
implications for the division of powers and  effective market regulation’, in Shuibhne, N.N. (ed), 
Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham/ Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2006) 210-43. 
36 In the previous paras of the present section. internal market case law, only in a handful of occasions has the Court second-
guessed the national preferences.
37 Rather, the Court exerts all its diligence on the 
issue of proportionality. 
ii. Less Clear rules: proportionality 
One would expect that the Member State which seeks to introduce a measure 
restrictive of some fundamental freedom should bear the burden of proving the 
proportionality of such measure. Indeed, in many cases the Court is quite demanding 
and requires that  
the reasons which may be invoked by a Member State in order to justify a 
derogation from the principle of freedom of establishment must be accompanied 
by an analysis of the appropriateness and proportionality of the restrictive 
measure adopted by that Member State, and by precise evidence enabling its 
arguments to be substantiated.
 38 
Or that  
In this connection, it is the Member State wishing to rely on an objective capable 
of justifying the restriction of the freedom to provide services which must supply 
the court called on to rule on that question with all the evidence of such a kind as 
to enable the court to be satisfied that the measure does indeed comply with the 
requirements deriving from the principle of proportionality
39 
This seemingly heavy burden of proof, however, is being mitigated by three 
‘correctives’.  
First, the Court admits that ‘that burden of proof cannot be so extensive as to require 
the Member State to prove, positively, that no other conceivable measure could 
enable that objective to be attained under the same conditions’.
40 What is more, a 
claim that a measure is proportional may not be dismissed ‘solely on the ground that 
that Member State is not able to produce studies serving as the basis for the 
adoption of the legislation at issue.
41  
Second, in an effort to dissipate fears of regulatory competition nurtured by its own 
case law i.a.  on posted workers, the Court has repeatedly held in its recent case law 
that ‘it is in particular not necessary, with regard to the criterion of proportionality, that 
                                                            
37 See Barnard, C., ‘Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?’ (2009) 68 Cambridge L J 
575-606 ; Hatzopoulos, V., ‘Exigences essentielles, impératives ou impérieuses: une théorie, des 
théories ou pas de théorie du tout?’ (1998) 34 RTDE 191-236. 
38 See eg Spanish Shopping Centres above n 29, para 83, emphasis added. 
39 See eg Stoss n 19, para 71 in fine; and Case Dickinger and Ömer n Error! Bookmark not defined., 
para 54, emphasis added. 
40 Case C-518/06 Commission v. Italy (motor insurance) [2009] ECR I-3491, para 84. 
41 Stoss n 19, para 72. a restrictive measure decreed by the authorities of one Member State should 
correspond to a view shared by all the Member States’.
42 
Therefore, not only is the ‘precise’ evidence required by the Court’s earlier judgments 
emptied from much of its substance, but also the comparison with other Member 
States’ practices which (as was the case in Stoss) may be more advanced and/or 
more efficient for securing the same interest, is not conclusive. 
Third, in at least one case, concerning the shareholding of biomedical laboratories in 
France, the Court has even mooted the idea that it is for the Commission to prove 
‘that the risks for the profession of biologist [or any other protected interest] could be 
removed with the same degree of effectiveness’ by other less restrictive measures.
43  
It need not be stressed here that such a requirement, if it were to be generalised, 
would require from the Commission a probatio diabolica and that it would significantly 
impair the Commission’s capacity in direct actions against Member States.  What is 
more, such a position would be in clear retreat in relation to the proof requirements 
imposed under WTO law, and the GATS in particular. In the US/Gambling case, 
where the issue was extensively debated by the Appeal Body, a fine equilibrium has 
been traced, whereby if the complainant raises a WTO-consistent alternative 
measure, it is up to the respondent ‘to demonstrate why its challenged measure 
nevertheless remains "necessary" in the light of that alternative’.
44 
II. Conditions for the admissibility of an authorisation system : authorisations 
as public procurement contracts 
a. Procedural 
According to well-established case law any procedure for the delivery of 
authorisations should fulfill three requirements: a) it should be based on criteria which 
are objective,  non-discriminatory and known in advance, b) it should be completed 
within reasonable time and c) it should be subject to review, either hierarchical or, 
wherever possible, judicial. 
45 
In the field of free movement of services, in particular, the Court has gone further by 
demanding that ‘the authorisation procedure set up by the host Member State must 
                                                            
42 See eg Stoss para 80; in the same sense see Liga Portuguesa paras 57-8 and Dickinger and Oemer 
paras 46-7. 
43 Case C-89/09 Commission v France (medical laboratories) [2010] ECR I- 12941, para 83. 
44 See AB report in US/Gambling, WT/DS285/AB/R, para 311. 
45 See eg the judgments on patient mobility, such as Case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting 
Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473, 
para 90; more recently see, Case C-203/08 Sporting Exchange Ltd v Minister van Justitie  [2010]  ECR 
I-04695, para 50, where it is made clear that  negarive decisions should be subject to judicial – as 
opposed to other types of – review.  neither delay nor complicate exercise of [the free provision of services]’;
46 it has even 
specified that where the conditions for the delivery of the authorisation are similar in 
the home and host States, and therefore open to mutual recognition
47 ‘any entry 
required on the trades register of the host Member State cannot be other than 
automatic, and […] cannot constitute a condition precedent for the provision of 
services, result in administrative expense […] or give rise to an obligation to pay 
subscriptions to the chamber of trades’.
48   
These requirements have been fleshed out in the Services Directive. Indeed, Article 
9(2) foresees that the criteria should be objective, known in advance etc, 9(3) that 
similar delivery conditions in the home and host States should be mutually 
recognised, 9(5) that the authorisation should be delivered without delay and 9(6) 
that negative decisions should be fully motivated and ‘open to challenge before the 
courts or other instances of appeal’. What is more Article 13, bears the title 
‘Authorisation procedures’ and further details the conditions for the delivery of the 
authorisations. A very important rule is contained in Articles 13(3) and (4), whereby 
the host State authorities should respond to the application within a set timeframe, 
failing which an authorisation ‘shall be deemed to have been granted’. This possibility 
of ‘tacit acquiescience’ which reverses the age-old rule in force in most continental 
countries, whereby ‘silence means dismissal’, could revolutionise the way public 
administrations deal with applications.
49 
Next to this first series of obligations, which tend to frame the discretion of national 
administrations and to offer minimal procedural guarantees to undertakings, a 
second set of procedural requirements has been progressively developed, aimed at 
securing effective competition between undertakings. Starting in Placanica, 
becoming more explicit in Sporting Exchange and Engelmann
50 and even more so in 
Costa and Cifone, the Court has put into place quite detailed rules concerning the 
conditions for the delivery of authorisations; rules which are derived from the ones 
applicable in the field of public procurement.
51  Therefore ‘without necessarily 
implying an obligation to call for tenders, that obligation of transparency [...] requires 
                                                            
46 Case C-58/98 Josef Corsten [2000] ECR I-7919, para 47; and Case C-215/01 Bruno Schnitzer [2003] 
ECR I-14847, para 36. 
47 For which see below under III. 
48 See eg Schnitzer para 37. 
49 This issue was extensively debated by the Court in the Spanish Shopping Centers case, above n. 29, 
where the Court found that no such obligation could stem directly from the Treaty rules themselves. 
50 Case C-64/08 Criminal proceedings against Ernst Engelmann [2010]  ECR I-8219. 
51 Sporting Exchange para 46 and on identical terms Engelmann, para 52. the licensing authority to ensure, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of 
publicity sufficient to enable the licence to be opened up to competition’.
52  
Therefore, the ‘revolution’ started over ten years ago, whereby the Court actively 
completed the public procurement rules and imposed a ‘transparency principle’
53 
applicable in all situations where the State is to choose a co-contractor (such as 
concession contracts, public-private partnerships and below-the-threshold public 
contracts)
54  is being extended to situations of delivery of authorisations. As with 
authorisations, this case law only concerns situations of potentially trans-border 
interest.
55 
This case law has prompted the Commission to come up with an interpretative 
Communication ‘on the community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully 
subject to the provisions of the public procurement directives’ (the so called de 
minimis Communication).
56 It further pushed for a large consultation to take place in 
relation to concession contracts and public-private partnerships (PPPs).
57 All this, in 
turn, has led to fresh proposals in order a) to reshuffle the existing legislative 
framework for public procurement and b) to adopt legislation in relation to concession 
contracts.
58  
Presumably, therefore, all the rules and principles set out by the Commission in the 
above texts of soft law also apply to the grant of authorisations. These also may be 
seen to flesh up the rule of Article 12(1) of the Services Directive, whereby a 
requirement of minimal publicity ensuring impartiality and transparence should apply 
in situations of natural and technical scarcity. What is more, they apply to situations 
where the limited number of authorisations to be delivered results from a deliberate 
                                                            
52 Costa and Cifone para 55. 
53 For the transparency principle see briefly above n 18 and the literature quoted there.  
54 For which see above n 18. 
55 See Costa and Cifone para 55; the requirement that the situation has to present some trans-border 
interest was spelled out in Case C-507/03 Commission v Ireland (An Post) [2007] ECR I-9777 and 
further explained in Joined cases C-147-148/06 SECAP SpA and Santorso Soc. coop. arl v. Comune di 
Torino [2008] ECR I-3565, para 24: ‘the estimated value [of the contract] in conjunction with its technical 
complexity or the fact that the works are to be located in a place which is likely to attract the interest of 
foreign operators’ 
56 OJ [2006] C179/2. 
57 Communication COM (2005) 569 final, ‘on Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public 
Procurement and Concessions’; and, as a follow up, Communication 2008/C 91/02 ‘on the application of 
Community law on Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships 
(IPPP)’ [2008] OJ C 91/4. 
58 See COM(2011) 897 final of 20.12.11; for all these proposals see the relevant Commission page at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/barnier/headlines/news/2011/12/20111220_en.htm#> last 
accessed on 29/04/13 political decision of the Member State concerned and not from natural/technical 
constraints.
59 
b. Substantial  
i. Extending non-discrimination from the delivery of the authorisation to the delivery of 
the service itself 
As explained above, the Court has come to treat several ‘objective’ conditions for the 
delivery of an authorisation as being discriminatory against operators from other 
Member States. This tendency has been floating in the Court’s case law for some 
time, until it found a clear expression in Costa and Cifone.
60 This tendency seems 
confirmed by Susisalo, a recent judgment concerning the Finnish system of delivery 
of authorisations for branch pharmacies, whereby the University of Helsinky was 
subject to more favourable conditions than private parties.
61 Without ever using the 
‘d’ word, the Court held that ‘the fact that the restrictive effects of that preferential 
system affect home country nationals and those from other Member States alike is 
not such as to exclude that preferential system from the scope of Article 49 TFEU’
62 
and therefore identifies a restriction by accepting that the ‘licensing scheme for the 
operation of branch pharmacies specific to the [University] is more favourable than 
that applicable to private pharmacies’.
63 A restriction which was found to be justified, 
in view of the educational and other functions performed by the University hospitals. 
This judgment beefs up the finding in Costa and Cifone: Costa stands for the idea 
that authorisation conditions may be de facto  discriminatory when they entail 
restrictions which were not applicable to the operators already in place, while 
Susisalo  makes clear that the operators discriminated against need not be 
exclusively, or even essentially, from other Member States.
64   
In  Costa and Cifone, where the Court identified a discrimination in the above-
mentioned terms,
65  it did so at the price of a logical leap: it moved from the 
formal/procedural conditions for the delivery of an authorisation to the material 
conditions of delivery of the service itself. According to the Court ‘the principle of 
                                                            
59 Directive 123/2006, art. 12(1) ; for a brief discussion of this provision and its relationship with the 
Placanica case law, see V. Hatzopoulos, « Que reste-t-il de la Directive Services » (2008) 43 Cahiers de 
Droit Européen, 299-358, 333-4. 
60 For a brief discussion of this trend see above the text accompanying n 27-31. 
61 Case C-84/11 Susisalo ea [2012] nyr. 
62 Ibid para 34, emphasis added. 
63 Ibid para 44 and operative part, emphasis added. 
64 See, recently, in the same logic Case C-542/09 Commission v The Netherlands (student grants) 
[2012] nyr para 38. 
65 See the text of n 30 and 31. equal treatment requires moreover [on top of objective, non-discriminatory criteria 
which are known in advance, as described in the previous para of the Court’s 
judgment] that all potential tenderers be afforded equality of opportunity and 
accordingly implies that all tenderers must be subject to the same conditions’ for the 
delivery of services.
66 This is not the case, however, where ‘[t]he very fact that the 
existing operators have been able to start up several years earlier than the operators 
unlawfully excluded, and have accordingly been able to establish themselves on the 
market with a certain reputation and a measure of customer loyalty, confers on them 
an unfair competitive advantage’.
67 
Therefore, by virtue of the principle of non-discrimination, not only the purely 
procedural conditions for the delivery of the authorisation, but also the substantial 
conditions for the delivery of the service in question should not entail any 
discrimination. This is a clear spill-over, in two ways: from procedural to substantive 
rules, and from internal market to competition law objectives. 
ii. Better regulation in the Member States? 
The principle of non-discrimination does not only cover the issuance of the 
authorisation as well as the conditions of exercise of the activity; it also extends to 
the circumstances in which such authorisation may be withdrawn, since ‘those 
situations also correspond in practice to conditions for obtaining a licence’.
68  Hence, 
‘the principle of transparency, which is a corollary of the principle of equality,  […] 
implies that all the conditions and detailed rules of the award procedure must be 
drawn up in a clear, precise and unequivocal manner’.
69 By way of extension, also 
‘the circumstances [of revocation] be set out in a clear, precise and unequivocal 
manner’.
70  
In this way the Internal Market rules impact on the quality of national regulation, since 
it requires it to be clear, precise and unequivocal, so as to secure legal certainty. By 
the same token the Court judges of the quality of national regulation, since it may 
decide to set it aside (as, indeed, it did in Costa and Cifone), if it does not fulfil the 
above criteria. This, combined to the age-old principle that compliance with EU law 
                                                            
66 Costa and Cifone para 57; the fact that the Court is concerned with the conditions of the delivery of 
services is confirmed by the following para of the judgment where the Court notes that ‘the effect of that 
measure is to protect the market positions acquired by the operators who are already established to the 
detriment of new licence holders, who are compelled to open premises in less commercially attractive 
locations than those occupied by the former. In consequence, such a measure entails discrimination 
against the operators which were excluded from the 1999 tendering procedure’. 
67 Costa and Cifone para 53. 
68 Ibid para 68. 
69 Ibid para 73. 
70 Ibid para 78. may not be secured through circulars or other acts of uncertain legal value and/or 
visibility,
71 may impact severely on the administrative practices of several Member 
States (essentially in the south of the EU), where the actual content of the regulation 
is being specified by way of non-binding acts. It may, therefore, be said that the Court 
is pushing towards ‘better regulation’.
72 
c. Judicial control: withdrawal of licences subject to a ‘remedies’ directive? 
Next to better regulation, the second aspect in which EU Internal Market Law impacts 
on the way national administrations run the various authorisation procedures, is by 
imposing extensive and effective judicial review obligations. Indeed, the Court finds 
that the principle of transparency requires that any decision taking back an an 
authorisation or imposing a sanction having equivalent effect (such as a heavy fine) 
‘may only [be] based on a judgment which has the force of res judicata and concerns 
a sufficiently serious offence’
73 and, that any ‘legislation which provides for operators 
to be excluded, even temporarily, from the market can be regarded as proportionate 
only if it provides for an effective legal remedy and compensation for any loss 
suffered’.
74 
 By asking for the above, the Court pushes beyond its well-established requirement 
for judicial review, in two ways. First, it requires that any exclusion from the market 
only becomes effective once the judgment pronouncing it becomes definitive. 
Therefore, it seems to be running against the generally accepted presumption of 
legality of administrative acts, whereby an appeal against an administrative decision 
or a judgment does not, on its own, suspend the effects of that very act. Second, the 
Court requires that judicial control is not only formal, but that it offers effective 
redress for any damage unduly suffered. In this way the Court seems to be pin-
pointing at extremely short limitation rules, as well as at restrictive proof rules 
concerning the damage suffered, common to most national legal orders. 
The above two requirements call for two observations. Firstly, that, if the Court 
decides to push these requirements further, they may radically reform the way that 
justice is being delivered within Member States. Indeed, Member States’ procedural 
autonomy is being framed – if not tamed – in view of securing the full effet utile of the 
Internal Market rules. If the consequences seem far-reaching, the logic of the Court is 
compelling. What is more, the Court’s role as the EU’s Constitutional Court, does call 
                                                            
71 See eg Case 167/73 Commission v France (code du travail maritime) [1974] ECR 359. 
72  For the concept of better regulation see, the various contributions to Weatherill, S. (ed), Better 
Regulation (Oxford/ Portland: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
73 Costa and Cifone para 81. 
74 Ibid. for unification of the law; and after fifty five years of bringing closer the substantive 
rules, it may be that some approximation of procedural rules is not completely 
misplaced. 
Secondly, one may not miss the link between these two requirements and the public 
procurement ‘Remedies Directive’ 2007/66.
75 Indeed, what the Remedies Directive 
does is, among other things, that it sets clear periods during which the award 
procedure is being suspended and it makes sure that unduly excluded tenderers may 
receive just compensation.
76 The parallelism between the Court’s judgment in Costa 
and Cifone and the Remedies Directive is further fleshed out by the fact that in the 
judgment in question, the plaintiff was admitted before the Court (and the preliminary 
question was not dismissed as inadmissible following the relevant argument by the 
Italian Government) despite the fact that it had not participated in the award 
procedure for the authorisations. This draws a clear parallel with Article 1(3) of the 
Remedies Directive and the Court’s well-established case law according to which the 
procedures put into place by the Directive are available also to tenderers who have 
not participated to a given procedure, provided they can show some interest.
77  
In this way a full circle is drawn and the transposition of public procurement rules and 
principles to the delivery of authorisations, under the Internal Market rules, seems to 
be perfect. Based on a general principle of non-discrimination and of transparency, 
supposedly governing the first stage of the award procedure and aimed at securing 
adequate publicity, the Court does much more: it circumscribes not only the material 
conditions for the award of the authorisation –  and even the conditions for the 
exercise of the activity in question – but also sets extremely high review standards. 
Therefore, not only the requirements of Directives 2004/18, 2004/17 and the 
corresponding interpretative Commission Communications may be of relevance – if 
not directly, at least as yardsticks – for authorisation procedures, but also the very 
Remedies Directive. 
                                                            
75 Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 
89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning 
the award of public contracts [2007] OJ L 335/31. 
76 For a brief presentation of this Directive see, among many, E. Chiti ‘Directive 2007/66 and the Difficult 
Search for Balance in Judicial Protection Concerning Public Procurements’ [2010] Italian Journal of 
Public Law, 125-53, also available at 
<http://www.ijpl.eu/assets/files/pdf/2010_volume_1/E.%20Chiti%20-%20Directive%202007-
66%20and%20the%20difficult%20search%20for%20balance%20in%20judicial%20protection.pdf> last 
accessed 29/04/13; see also E. Olsson ‘The Full Force and Effect of Public Procedure Remedies – the 
general principles of directive  2007/66, available at 
<http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1560955&fileOId=1565479> last 
accessed 29/04/13, who in his concluding section specifically addresses the question of whether the 
directive satisfies to the principles of effectiveness and effective judicial protection – and finds to the 
positive. 
77 Case C-230/02 Grossmann [2004] ECR I -1829. III. Mutual recognition of authorisations 
Mutual recognition has always occupied a core role in the creation of an internal 
market for services.
78 It has served as the foundation of services liberalisation, by the 
judiciary, especially at times when secondary legislation in the field of services was 
scarce. Further, it has been put to work by the legislature, in different variants: EU 
passports for banks, insurance and financial service providers; internal market clause 
for ISP and e-commerce providers; country of origin principle (or almost) for TV 
broadcasters. The fact that the Services Directive was adopted only after the country-
of-origin principle was dropped, means that, but for few sector-specific activities, 
there is no such thing as automatic recognition of authorisations of service providers 
(a). Indeed, if mutual recognition of authorisations in the field of goods is, henceforth, 
an issue extensively dealt with by secondary law, in the field of services the role of 
the Court continues being core (b). 
a. Managed mutual recognition: Passports and Internal Market Clauses 
The fact that authorisations at the national level create obstacles to free movement 
has prompted the EU legislature to intervene in key areas of economic activity and to 
put into  place a system of managed mutual recognition. Hence, following some 
(more or less extensive) harmonisation, the authorisations delivered by the one 
Member State would be valid in all other Member States. The first areas in which 
such a system has been followed were financial and banking services, as well as 
insurance, by way of the so called ‘European Passports’.
79 These Passports, initially 
issued and monitored by national authorities, have progressively been subject to 
extensive harmonisation
80 and, lately, also monitoring, at the EU level, in a way that 
nowadays one can talk of a centralized system of authorisation and control of 
financial institutions.
81  
                                                            
78  For an early analysis see V. Hatzopoulos Le  principe communautaire de reconnaissance et 
d’équivalence mutuelle dans la libre prestation de services  (Athènes/Bruxelles: Sakkoulas/Bruylant, 
1999) ; for an updated evaluation see, by the same author ‘Le principe de reconnaissance mutuelle 
dans la libre prestation de services’ CDE (2010) 47-93; and for slightly different focus Hatzopoulos 
‘Forms of Mutual Recognition in the Field of Services’ in I. Lianos and O. Odudu (eds) Regulating Trade 
in Services in the EU and the WTO: Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration (Cambridge: CUP, 2012) 
59-98; see also K. Nicolaidis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through mutual recognition’ 
(2007) 15 JEPP 682-698, who also uses the terms ‘managed’ and ‘pure’ mutual recognition, in the way 
they will be used hereunder. 
79 For which see, among many Lomincka above n 2. 
80 Especially so since the adoption of the MiFiD, European Parliament and Council Dir 2004/39/EC on 
markets in financial instruments [2004] OJ L145/1. The MiFiD itself was further modified by European 
Parliament and Council Directives 2006/31/EC [2006] OJ L114/60, 2007/44/EC [2007] OJ L247/1, 
2008/10/EC [2008] OJ L76/33, 2009/65/EC [2009] OJ L 302/32 and 2010/78 [2010] OJ L 331/120. 
81 For this evolution see, among briefly Hatzopoulos Regulating Services in the EU , 231-8 and the 
literature cited there. More ambitious than the ‘passport’ system, has been the introduction of the ‘internal 
market clause’, to the extent that it was based on very light prior harmonisation. An 
early version of this clause was used in the ‘Television Without Frontiers’ (TVWF) 
Directive, adopted as far back as in 1989 and amended several times ever since, for 
the last time through the adoption of the so called ‘Audio Visual Media Directive’ 
(AVMS).
82 Alongside this ‘media’ Directive are the two e-Directives, adopted during 
the dot-com bubble, with the aim of encouraging the emergence of pan-European 
providers of electronic services (e-services) that would be in a position to compete on 
the international scene. The first text concerns the provision of electronic 
signatures,
83 while the second is more concerned with content and e-commerce in 
general.
84  
Internal Market Clauses take the form of a quid pro quo: home state authorities make 
sure that service providers established in their territory satisfy the minimum 
coordinated rules, which are essentially connected to the protection of general 
interest. In return, host state authorities cannot exclude such ‘compliant’ service 
providers, for any reason falling within the coordinated field. IMCs are based on strict 
‘nationality’ requirements intended to restrict arbitrary or otherwise abusive 
‘regulatory shopping’ by service providers.
85  
The extent to which the Court is attached to the proper and effective application of 
Internal Market Clauses may be illustrated by reference to its recent judgment in 
Mesopotamia.
86  Was at stake the prohibition, by the German authorities, of the 
activities on German territory of two Danish companies broadcasting emissions and 
footages in favour of the Kurdish PKK, a terrorist organisation. The companies in 
question were authorized under Danish law, in compliance with the TVWF Directive. 
Therefore, despite the fact that the Court accepted the German view that the 
                                                            
82 Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by Law, Regulation 
or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities 
[1989] OJ L298/23; modified by the European Parliament and Council Directive 97/36/EC [1997] OJ 
L202/60). European Parliament and Council Directive 2007/65/EC amending Council Directive 
89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities [2007] OJ L332/27; 
on the AVMS see Geach, N., ‘Converging Regulation for Convergent Media: an overview of the AVMS’ 
(2008) 1 J of Information L and Technology  1-19, also available at   
<http://go.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2008_1/geach> last accessed on 29/04/13; see also Valcke, P., Stevens, D., 
Lievens, E., and Werkers, E., ‘AVMS in the EU, Next Generation Approach or Old Wine in New 
Barrels?’ (2008) 71 Communications and Strategies 103-18. 
83 E-signature Directive (European Parliament and Council Dir 1999/93/EC on a Community framework 
for electronic signatures [2000] OJ L13/12).  
84 E-Commerce Directive (European Parliament and Council Dir 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1).  
85 The trend is for such requirements to become increasingly strict, as can be witnessed in the AVMS 
Directive. 
86 Joined Cases C-244-245/10 Mesopotamia Broadcast and Roj [2011] nyr. contested emissions did constitute incitation to hatred and thus could justify 
measures based on public order, morality and security, it held that such measures 
could not hinder retransmission itself (covered by the Directive), but could only 
concern other related activities (such as the production of broadcasts and the 
organisation of events and sympathy actions) carried out on German territory. Hence, 
although the Court was openly sympathetic towards the German government’s 
worries, it was not ready to loosen up the application of the Internal Market Clause.  
This is a strong sign that in areas where the delivery of authorisations is subject to 
some EU harmonisation and/or overview, it will be extremely difficult for Member 
States to invoke national interests – unless these have been completely ignored by 
the EU legislature at the first place.  
b. Pure mutual recognition 
In areas not covered by any text of secondary law, where mutual recognition only 
delves on the Court’s determinism, the Court has followed an ambivalent approach. 
i. General trend: recognition of everything but the authorisation 
According to well-established case law mutual recognition covers all the elements 
leading to the authorisation, but the authorisation itself. Therefore, the host Member 
State is supposed to recognise documents irrespective of whether these are 
harmonised
87  or not,
88  as well as conformity certificates  and assimilated 
documents.
89 It is also supposed to recognise the professional qualifications acquired 
in any other Member State, irrespective of whether such qualifications fall within the 
relevant Directive
90 (which the Court interprets in an extensive manner)
91 or not.
92  
What is more, guarantee deposits with Banks in other member states should always 
and under any circumstance be recognised. Any opposite solution would violate 
                                                            
87 See eg Case C-326/00 IKA v Ioannidis [2003] ECR I-1703 and Case C-202/97 Fitzwilliam [2000] ECR 
I-883,  for documents E 111 (covering urgent medical care) and E 102 (certifying affiliation to a 
compulsory pension scheme), respectively; see also Case C-476/01  Kapper  [2004] ECR I-5205 
concerning driving licences. 
88 See eg Case C-274/05 Commission v Greece (University Degrees) [2008] ECR I-7969. 
89  See eg Case C-6/05  Medipac  [2007] ECR I-4557; Case C-489/06  Commission  v Greece (EC 
markings) [2009] ECR I-1797; see also Case C-432/03 Commission v Portugal, plastic pipes [2005] 
ECR I-9665. 
90  The Professional Qualifications Directive 2005/31/EC [2005] OJ L 255/22, codifying various pre-
existing texts; itself currently under review, see COM(2011) 883 final. 
91 See eg Case C-313/01 Morgenbesser [2003] ECR I-13467 and Case C-234/97 Bobadilla [1999] ECR 
I-4773. 
92 See eg Case 222/86 Unectef v. Georges Heylens ao [1987] ECR 4097; Case 71/76 Jean Thieffry v. 
Conseil de l'ordre des avocats à la cour de Paris [1977] ECR 765; and Case C-340/89 Vlassopoulou v. 
Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelengheiten Baden- Württemberg [1991] ECR I-2357. simultaneously a) the free movement of service providers (being an indirect 
discrimination), b) the free movement of banking services (being an absolute 
prohibition) and c) the free movement of capital (being an absolute prohibition).
 93  
Another element which has been taken into account by the home Member State in 
order to deliver its  authorisation should be duly taken into account by any other 
Member State. Two recent cases illustrate this obligation.  In Commission v Italy 
(sanitary services),
94  Italy was found in breach of Article 56 TFEU because the 
registration system it imposed did ‘exclude from its scope a provider of services who 
is established in a Member State other than the Italian Republic and who […] under 
the legislation of its Member State of establishment, already satisfies formal 
requirements equivalent to those under the Italian Law’.  The Italian authorities 
should, before imposing any of the sanctions foreseen for breach of the registration 
procedure, examine whether the same or similar conditions as the ones required for 
registration were not already satisfied by the service providers in their home states.  
In  Commission v Portugal (construction)  was at stake the system of prior 
authorisation of all construction workers operating in this country for a period 
exceeding a year.
95  The Court reminded that a service provision  may go on for 
periods longer than a year, and repeated its settled case law according to which any 
prior authorisation requirement constitutes a restriction to Article 56 TFEU. It then 
went on to the control of proportionality of the measure. In this context it stated that ‘a 
national authorisation scheme goes beyond what is necessary where the 
requirements to which the issue of authorisation is subject duplicate the equivalent 
evidence and safeguards required in the Member State of establishment, inferring in 
particular an obligation on the part of the host Member State to take account of 
controls and verifications already carried out in the Member State of establishment’.
96 
The Court, thus, found that the Portuguese scheme could not be upheld since it 
‘precludes the possibility of account being duly taken of equivalent obligations to 
which such an undertaking is subject in the Member State of establishment or of the 
verifications already carried out in that regard by the authorities of that Member 
State’.
97  In this way the Court draws a very close line to the country of origin 
principle, vilified and abandoned by the Services Directive. Indeed, if the 
                                                            
93  Case C-263/99  Commission v Italy, transport consultants [2001] ECR I-4195; Case C-279/00 
Commission c/Italy, temporary labour agencies [2002] ECR I-1425. 
94 Case C-358/98 Commission v Italy (sanitary services) [2000] ECR I-1255, para 13. 
95Case C-458/08 Commission v Portugal (construction) [2010] ECR I-11599. 
96Ibid para 100, emphasis added. 
97Ibid para 101. authorisation delivered by the home State of the service provider is not recognized as 
such by the host State authorities, all the elements leading to such authorisation 
should be. To the extent that, by virtue of the Services Directive, Member States 
need to justify all the authorisation schemes that they seek to maintain by reference 
to objective criteria, they are likely to end up imposing similar requirements for similar 
activities. Such requirements should, according to the above case law, be subject to 
mutual recognition, thus leading to de facto recognition of the authorisation itself.  
The same idea is also expressed in Article 10(3) of the Services Directive, according 
to which ‘The conditions for granting authorisation for a new establishment shall not 
duplicate requirements and controls which are equivalent or essentially comparable 
as regards their purpose to which the provider is already subject in another Member 
State or in the same Member State.’ 
ii. Sensitive areas: no mutual recognition at all! 
A second, and opposing, tendency, however, may be identified in the Court’s recent 
case law, whereby the very foundations of mutual recognition are being questioned. 
This ‘assault’ on mutual recognition has been essentially staged in the area of 
gambling and gaming, but ‘collateral damages’ may not be excluded.  
Liga Portuguesa,
98 concerned the exclusive right given under Portuguese law to a 
single, state-controlled, operator to run all games of chance in the country. The Court 
reminded that in relation to gaming, an area where any harmonization is lacking, 
Member States enjoy wide discretion. It held that   
‘a Member State is therefore entitled to take the view that the mere fact that 
an operator such as Bwin lawfully offers services in that sector via the internet 
in another Member State, in which it is established and where it is in principle 
already subject to statutory conditions and controls  on the part of the 
competent authorities in that State, cannot be regarded as amounting to a 
sufficient assurance that national consumers will be protected against the 
risks of fraud and crime’.
99 
This is a striking finding since it questions the fundamentals of mutual recognition, at 
least whenever such recognition is not ‘managed’, ie organized by some text of 
                                                            
98Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International Ltd v Departamento de 
Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa [2009] ECR I-7633. 
99Ibid para 69, emphasis added. secondary legislation proceeding to some degree of harmonisation. A first remark 
concerns the language used by the Court. What has been the quintessential 
condition on which mutual recognition has been grounded ever since Van 
Binsbergen  and  Cassis de Dijon,
100ie the fact that the operator/product has been 
lawfully authorised in another Member State is here described as a ‘mere fact’. 
Second, it is clear from this very passage that the Court does not allude to any 
situation of abuse of rights or fraude à la loi, since it clearly states that the operator is 
established and is subject to statutory conditions and controls. Third, the Court states 
that the above holds true in the absence of harmonisation, but it is unclear how much 
harmonisation would be enough for mutual recognition to be operational: if full 
harmonisation, by definition, does not leave any place for mutual recognition, and no 
harmonisation at all excludes it (according to the above finding) then a grey area of 
‘partial’ harmonisation is being designed by the Court and needs to be further 
clarified.  
In the immediately following paragraph of the same judgment the Court makes 
reference to the specific nature of the internet and to risks associated with the lack of 
direct contact between the parties –  a reference repeated in other gambling 
judgments.
101 It could be thought, therefore, that the above negation of the principle 
of mutual recognition could be limited to situations where delicate services are 
offered over the internet. Such an explanation, however, has been tacitly dismissed 
by the Court. In Dickinger and Ömer, a case concerning the Austrian system of 
authorisations for online games, the Court without any reference to the internet 
solemnly stated that 
102 
‘no duty of mutual recognition of authorisations issued by the various Member 
States can exist in the current state of European Union law’ since ‘the mere 
fact that an operator lawfully offers services in one Member State, in which it 
is established and is in principle already subject to statutory conditions and 
controls on the part of the competent authorities of that State, cannot be 
regarded as a sufficient assurance that national consumers will be protected 
against the risks of fraud and crime’. 
                                                            
100 Case 33/74 Johannes Hervicus Maria van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Metaalnijverheid  [1974] ECR 1299; Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649. 
101 See eg Case C-258/08 Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming Ltd and Ladbrokes International Ltd v Stichting 
de Nationale Sporttotalisator  [2010]   ECR I-4757, para 55; Case C-212/08 Zeturf Ltd  [2011] nyr, para 
80. 
102Ibid para 96. As if this were not clear enough the Court further explained that
103 
‘A Member State may legitimately wish, moreover, to monitor an economic 
activity which is carried on in its territory, and that would be impossible if it 
had to rely on checks done by the authorities of another Member State using 
regulatory systems which it itself does not grasp’. 
It is the first time to the knowledge of the present author that the Court pronounces 
such an outspoken negation of mutual recognition.
104 If it is precise that no mutual 
recognition of authorisations, as such, has ever been imposed by the Court, it has 
been explained above that the Court’s general case law pointed in the direction of 
recognizing everything but the authorisation itself. In these cases, however, the trend 
is clearly reversed: since mutual recognition is in principle dismissed, Member States 
are unconstrained to choose not only the level of protection but also the means 
appropriate for attaining it – excluding by the same token any alternative means. 
Hence in Dickinger and Ömer the Court accepted that Austria could freely opt for the 
more ‘archaic’ means of control instead of being forced into considering the efficiency 
of the (presumably better-performing) ITC-based means of control pioneered by 
Malta.
 105 This is questionable on two accounts. First, because it approves of artificial 
and unnecessary grounds for partitioning the internal market since it allows full 
‘sovereignty’ to national controls, however inefficient and/or arbitrary these may be. 
Second, because, contrary to previous case law where the Court pushes Member 
State authorities to improve and to rationalize their practices by reference to 
international practices,
106 here the Court readily settles for inefficiency. What is more, 
the above statements seem to be denying the idea that mutual recognition 
constitutes a general principle of law, applicable in all circumstances.
107  
Conclusion 
Authorisation systems offer efficient ways of regulating economic activities. 
Regulating through the delivery of authorisations may be justified either by 
natural/technical reasons, or by political choices; the EU may not change the former 
                                                            
103Ibid para 98. 
104 This pronouncement should be seen in combination with the finding in Stoss, above n  para 109, 
according to which mutual recognition of authorisations is ‘ex hypothesi’  excluded in areas where the 
Member State concerned has opted for the existence of a monopoly. 
105Ibid para 98. 
106 See eg in the field of healthcare, Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-
368/98 Vanbraekel  [2001] ECR I-5363; Case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts 
v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health [2006] ECR I-4325. 
107Idea explained by Hatzopoulos op.cit. above n 78. nor second-guess the latter. It has, therefore, to put up with authorisation regimes put 
into place by Member States, even though these may constitute restrictions – and 
even discriminations – prohibited by the Internal Market law.  
In doing so, however, the EU does impact on such regimes, in four ways. First, the 
EU Courts, prompted by the Commission, may exercise some (limited) control over 
the objective necessity for establishing an authorisation system. Second, and more 
spectacularly, the Court together with the Commission have been actively defining 
the conditions, procedural and material, for the delivery of authorisations. By so doing 
they have been actively interfering not only with the supposed ‘procedural autonomy’ 
of Member States, but also with the way national administrations operate. The 
Services Directive is also expected to have a very important input in this direction. 
Third, the Court and the legislature have been imposing quite extensive mutual 
recognition obligations. Mutual recognition may cover the authorisation itself, when it 
is managed through some text of secondary legislation, or all the elements but the 
authorisation itself, when it imposed directly by the Court; exceptionally, in the 
absence of any harmonisation and in view of considerable differences mutual 
recognition may be altogether inoperative. Fourth, where mutual recognition proves 
not to be effective, the EU may take over from the Member States and fully regulate 
specific activities, such as financial and assimilated services. These four 
developments have been briefly presented in the present contribution.  
The germs of such developments were present in the early case law of the Court, 
starting with Van Binsbergen and Cassis de Dijon.
108 The fact, however, that EU law 
would have such a profound impact on the way authorisation systems are decided, 
implemented and monitored by the Member States could have been hardly foreseen. 
Indeed, this outcome stems from several concurring developments: the expansive 
definition of the concept of restriction and/or discrimination by the Court, as well as 
the express consecration of the ‘market access’ criterion for the violation of the 
Internal Market rules; progressive recognition of the non-discrimination and 
transparency principles as guiding all ‘public procurement like’ procedures; the 
adoption of the Services Directive; the regulatory adjustments made essential in 
order to tame the financial and economic crisis, are just few of the jigsaw pieces 
which brought things where they stand today. The need to re-launch the European 
economy may only push further in the direction of Europeanization of authorisation 
regimes.  
 
                                                            
108 Above n 100.  
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